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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CITATION 
PRESERVING ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
This appeal from an order entered February 18, 2003 granting Appellee Peterson's 
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R. 113. 
(This appeal was transferred to the Utah Supreme Court by ordered dated December 30, 
2002. R. 106.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Brown's defective appeal should be dismissed because he applies the 
incorrect standard of review on appeal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
2. Whether the lower court properly dismissed Appellant's defective pleadings 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE on the grounds that the 
allegations in the complaint failed to state any claim against Appellee Robert Peterson. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellee, Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson"), moved below under Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to dismiss the complaint (the "Complaint") of 
appellant Alan Brown, M.D. ("Appellant or Dr. Brown") on the grounds that the allegations 
in the Complaint failed to state a claim against Appellee. R. at 49. 
1. PROCEDURAL DEFECTS AND INCORRECT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW IN BROWN'S BRIEF 
Brown's brief dated May 19, 2004 (the "Brief) constitutes Brown's second failed 
attempt to comply with this Court's rules. By Order dated May 5,2004 (the "Order"), this 
Court previously found that Brown's original brief, dated February 12,2004 (the "Original 
Brief) failed to comply with the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24 and 11, but permitted 
Brown to file a compliant brief within 30 days of the Order. Although the some of the 
deficiencies of the Original Brief were remedied through the Brief, the Brief remains 
defective and inadequate because it raises factual contentions that are not supported by the 
record below. 
Brown claims that in this appeal that "[appellee's] motion to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading [sic] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment." Appellant's Brief at 1. Citing his memoranda filed to oppose Peterson's 
Motion to Dismiss, Brown devotes his brief and argument to the standard for summary 
judgment rather than that applicable to a motion to dismiss repeatedly referencing 
memoranda rather than his complaint. Appellant's Brief at 1. Despite prior opportunities to 
apply the correct standard of appeal1, Brown stubbornly insists that the appeal of the Order 
Granting Peterson's Motion to Dismiss must be treated as one for summary judgment. 
Brown tries to convert this appeal to a factual dispute by citing to arguments in his 
memoranda below rather than focusing on his dismissed complaint. His arguments on appeal 
rely on allegations and documents not part of his complaint and which are only found in 
unsubstantianted and inadmissible documents and arguments made in memoranda. 
The lower court never looked outside the pleadings, nor should it have, and this appeal 
may not now be converted to an appeal of a non-existent summary judgment. Brown cannot 
1
 In Peterson's Motion to Strike Appellant's Brief and in Brown's first Appellee's 
Brief, Peterson noted that Brown had applied the incorrect standard of review. 
2 
now make this appeal a hearing on a non-existent motion for summary judgment by 
incorporating documents to which he referred in memoranda below to contest phantom facts 
and allegations not found in his complaint. 
Accordingly, having briefed and argued facts not on the record, having applied the 
incorrect legal standard, and by incorporating exhibits and "facts" never before the lower 
court and not pertinent to his appeal, the lower court's order granting Brown's Motion to 
Dismiss should be upheld. 
2. BROWN'S CLAIMS AGAINST PETERSON ON APPEAL 
Dr. Brown's claims below arose when he couldn't use an "optimal" or "superior" 
microscope he preferred. R. at 21- 31. His complaint recites that "[Brown] was of the 
opinion that in the interests of quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled surgical assistant 
and the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was optimal." R. 29. Nonetheless, because 
Appellant could not use a "newer" arguably better microscope, the two surgeons against 
whom the action was filed somehow intended to interfere with his economic relations. R 21, 
22. 
Although the microscopes at issue are considered by the hospital as capital equipment, 
R. 22, Brown filed a civil action against two surgeons, one appellee Dr. Robert Peterson, 
claiming "actual damages" of $ 18,296.50, for unspecified economic injury, punitive damages 
and injunctive relief claiming a conspiracy to deny him use of a particular microscope. R. 20, 
21, 22, and 33. 
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Having dismissed the other surgeon below, Brown doggedly pursues this appeal only 
against Peterson because he once referred to Brown as a "banned surgeon." R.26. There is 
nothing more in Brown's complaint about Peterson. Other than the solitary reference as 
"banned surgeon" Brown's complaint is silent how or when Peterson actually, if ever, 
deprived or otherwise prevented Peterson from using any microscope. Claiming that he 
couldn't use the preferred microscope, Brown claims that Dr. Peterson somehow "intended" 
to interfere with Appellant's prospective economic relations and therefore damaged Brown. 
R.31. 
Because Brown makes no allegation that Peterson actually prevented Brown from 
using any microscope, Brown's complaint is defective, stated no claim against Peterson and 
was properly dismissed by the lower court. In his complaint, Brown cryptically alleged that 
the two physician-defendants in the lower court, two neurological surgeons, "have engaged 
in a pattern of activity including directly and indirectly intimidating others through actions 
and/or omissions with the intent to interfere with [Brown's] economic relations by 
wrongfully restricting access to essential hospital equipment for an improper purpose and 
through improper means causing injury to [Brown.]" R. 31 
Referring to the now-dismissed Dr. Reichmann against whom Brown directed 
substantially all his allegations below, Brown claimed that "even if the defendant's [sic] acts 
were not for the purpose of interfering with the [Brown's] economic relations . . . the 
interference was intentional." R. 32. 
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Distilled to its essence and given the very most liberal construction to his pleadings, 
Brown alleged below that because he was not able to use a particular microscope in surgery, 
he has been damaged because he "felt uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his 
patient and canceled the procedure." R. at 12. Brown never alleges how appellee Peterson 
prevented such use other than to refer to Brown as a "banned surgeon." R. at 26. 
Because Brown stated no claim against Peterson in his complaint, the lower court 
granted Peterson's Motion to Dismiss. R. 113. Fatal there and to this appeal is the absence 
of any allegation against Peterson of how he deprived or prevented Brown from using an 
"optimal" microscope or otherwise interfered with Brown's prospective economic relations. 
Also fatal to his claims below is Brown's admission that another microscope, although 
allegedly "inferior," was available for his use during surgery. R. 21, 22, 23 and 29. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS AND UNSUBSTANTIATED EXHIBITS 
OUTSIDE THE COMPLAINT CANNOT CURE OR AMEND 
THE DEFECT'S IN BROWN'S COMPLAINT 
In a sly attempt to support his defective complaint below, Brown relies on "facts" 
which are not supported by the record and were not part of the complaint below. Brown now 
cites as "facts" and the "record," statements and allegations made in his memoranda 
opposing Peterson's Motion to Dismiss below. By relying to statements in his memoranda 
below, Brown attempts to establish "facts" and other "allegations" which are not part of 
Brown's defective complaint on which this appeal must focus. 
Because this is an appeal of an order granting amotion dismissing Brown's complaint 
for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, there is only one relevant fact: 
What is in the complaint? See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 
9, f 30, 70 P. 2d 17 (noting in context of review of motion to dismiss that"' we consider only 
the legal sufficiency of the complaint'") quoting Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Prop. 
&Cas.Ins.Co.. 890 P.2d 1029,1030 (Utah 1995); Clark v. Deloitte & Touche. 2001 UT 90, 
Tf 14,34 P.3d 209 (same). In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, this Court "accept[s] 
the factual allegations in the complaint as true." Krouse v. Bowen 2001 UT 28, f 2,20 P.3d 
895; see also Pendleton v. Utah State Ban 2000 UT 96,%5, 16 P.3d 1230 (same). Factual 
allegations outside the purview of the complaint are at best irrelevant in an appeal of the 
6 
dismissal of a complaint. The only relevant "facts" to this appeal are dictated solely by 
Brown's complaint below. 
Brown's brief contains numerous "allegations" or citations not found in Brown's 
complaint. To cite only a few examples: 
Brief at 3: "The Defendants/Appellees are also partners acting under the 
business name Neurosurgical Associates, L.L.C." This statement can be found 
in the Memorandum of Law R. 64), but does not appear to be in the 
corresponding portion of the complaint R. 20). 
Brief at 4: "The Defendants/Appellees have never disputed that the Leica and 
the newer Zeiss microscopes are superior in quality to the older Zeiss." This 
statement can be found in the Memorandum of Law R. 65), but does not 
appear to be in the corresponding portion of the complaint R. 21). 
Brief at 6: "The letter also states that '[t]he neurosurgeons have met in this 
regard and the opinions are unanimous.'" This statement can be found in the 
Memorandum of Law R. 67), but does not appear to be in the corresponding 
portion of the complaint R. 25). 
Brief at 7: "This was a direct and intentional attempt to keep the 
Plaintiff/Appellant from rightfully using this equipment." This statement is 
similar to a statement in the Memorandum of Law R. 69), but a different 
statement is found in the complaint R. 28). 
7 
Brief at 7: "The Plaintiff7Appellees claimed that these statements were 
fraudulent." This statement is similar to a statement in the Memorandum of 
Law R. 74), but does not appear to be in the corresponding portion of the 
complaint R. 28). 
This Court and Peterson are left to sort out the actual statements in Brown's complaint 
from his later embellishments. It is Brown's responsibility to marshall the evidence (which 
would be found in the complaint itself) and present it to this Court. It is not the responsibility 
of the Court or the parties to marshall the evidence for Brown's benefit or address issues 
never before the lower court. Brown's reliance on the Memorandum of Law for factual 
matters which are not in the complaint only illustrates why his complaint was dismissed 
below for failing to state a claim against Peterson. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1109-
10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (declining to consider merits of appeal where brief "sets forth little 
legal analysis on the issue presented, does not specifically discuss how the trial court erred, 
does not even attempt to marshal the evidence, and presents no citations to the record."); 
Koulisv. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182,1184-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (disregarding brief 
and assuming correctness of judgment below where brief "contains no citations to the record 
for factual allegations other than several general references to the lease agreements."); State 
v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) (assuming correctness of judgment below where brief 
"failed to refer to any portion of the record that factually supports" contentions on appeal). 
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POINT II 
BROWN'S CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE 
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE TORT OF "INTENT" TO INTERFERE 
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Utah law does not recognize the tort of "intent' to interfere with prospective economic 
relations but, rather, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 
Appellee concedes that even though Appellee may not have actually interfered with 
Appellee's prospective economic relations, the interference was intentional R at 32, (f 5). 
Having conceded that there was no actual interference with Appellee's actual economic 
relations, under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982), the Complaint is defective and was properly dismissed by 
the lower court. 
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
defendant is liable for tortious interference with business relationships if the plaintiff proves 
"(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential 
economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury 
to the plaintiff.11 A party is subject to liability for an intentional interference with present 
contractual relations if he intentionally and improperly causes one of the parties not to 
perform the contract Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979). St. Benedict's 
Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991). 
Conspicuous by its absence in Appellee's complaint is any factual allegation that Dr. 
Peterson intentionally or otherwise unlawfully actually prevented Brown from performing 
9 
the surgery causedBrown not to perform any contract or otherwise prevented interfered with 
any economic relationship as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet and St. Benedict's 
Development Company Co. Distilled to its essence, the sole allegation on which Brown rests 
his entire case against Dr. Peterson was that he commented to a colleague that Brown was 
a "banned surgeon" and could not use a particular microscope. R. at 26. Brown admits that 
after this single comment on September 17,2002, that "from October 1 st, 2001 until July 2nd, 
2002," he utilized "the Leica and newer Ziess microscope without apparent problems." R.28. 
Thereafter, the pleadings are absent as to any other reasonable inference that Dr. Peterson 
committed any unlawful act or other breach of duty allegedly owed to Brown. There is 
simply no allegation in the Complaint that Dr. Peterson actually interfered with any contract 
or economic relationship. Instead, the allegations were against Dr. Reichman, dismissed 
below, not Dr. Peterson. R. 22 - 24; 29 -32. Further, Brown requested "additional damages 
. . . as a result of the Defendant's [sic] continued unlawful actions and omission," . . . not 
because of any acts of the defendants (plural) (emphasis supplied.) R. 14, line 9, 12. ("Even 
if the Defendant's acts . . . . ")(emphasis supplied). 
Brown, a surgeon, does not specify how his economic relations were affected or 
whether patients were ill-served by anything that Appellee did or didn't do.2 As trite as it may 
2
 Brown alleges that on July 2, 2002, ten (10) months after the "banned surgeon" 
comment, he "felt uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and 
canceled the procedure." R. 30. Brown does not allege whether this alleged cancellation 
of surgery caused any damages, whether the procedure was later rescheduled nor does he 
allege how Dr. Peterson (or any other person) improperly interfered with the surgical 
procedure. Another microscope was available for the surgery Brown cancelled. R. 29. 
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seem, Brown does not have, and has not alleged, that he has a contractual right to use any 
particular microscope. R. 3 - 4. Rather, he assumes that as a surgeon at a hospital if he is not 
allowed to use any microscope of his choosing he is damaged. R. 10 -12. Although Brown 
corresponded with various other physicians about his desire to use a particular microscope, 
among all the physicians at the hospital he targeted only two and pursues this appeal against 
only one surgeon, because that surgeon referred to Brown as a "banned surgeon." R. 5 -11 . 
Appellee recites in his Complaint that he petitioned hospital administration about the dispute 
but that there has been "no written or verbal response[s]" to his letter. R. 9. Because Dr. 
Reichmann, not appellee Dr. Peterson, did not have the "authority to restrict access to the 
microscope," Brown brought his action against Dr. Reichman. R. 12. 
Brown's Complaint is also defective and was properly dismissed below because he 
has no standing to bring claims against "[defendants" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-
501(2)(a), (2)(b)b and 58-67-50 l(c)(i). R 31. Proceedings for alleged unprofessional or 
unethical conduct is exclusively the duty of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing under Chapter 58 of the UTAH CODE. Brown had no standing to allege violations 
of Utah law in the action below and does not address his lack of standing in his appeal. 
The same omissions, deficiencies and errors fatal to Brown's action below carry over 
to this appeal. Brown ignores clear precedent and applicable procedure attaching to his brief 
correspondence and other documents which are not part of the record and have no place in 
this appeal and cannot be used to cure or now amend the Complaint the lower court 
dismissed because of its defects. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly dismissed Dr. Brown's civil action below. A solitary 
reference to Brown as a "banned surgeon" does not rise to the level of tortious interference 
of economic relations as Brown contends. With undisputed Utah law and precedent dictating 
what actions may be lawfully addressed in this state's courts, Brown's allegations below 
were and remain defective as a matter law and stated no claim against Dr. Peterson. Because 
Brown's pleadings below and brief on appeal fail to satisfy the most fundamental 
requirements of Utah law, his Complaint and this appeal fall short of stating any claim for 
tortious interference with economic relations against Dr. Peterson. 
Because no actionable claim was plead against Dr. Peterson below and because Brown 
brief is defective, the record replete with inadmissible and unfounded references, the Order 
of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing Brown's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) may be 
properly and lawfully upheld. 
Respectfully submitted 9th day of August, 2004. 
PARSONSJ^mGH0RN HARRIS, P . C ^ < ? 
/ HaWcl L. Reiser 
Attorneys for Appellee - Dr. Robert Peterson 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Amended Complaint and Jury Demand. R. 19-36 
Alan B. Brown (#7693) 
Attorney, acting for himself 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801) 541-5492 
(801) 964-3436 fax 
I ~ r j 
CO 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert 
Peterson, M.D. 
Defendants 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Case No. 
Judge 
Pursuant to URCP Rule 15(a), Plaintiff requests the Court 
accept this Amended Complaint and Jury Demand. The 
amendment consists of changing Claim (1) to read: "From May 
23rd, 2001 through the present, Defendants have used 
unprofessional and unethical conduct with the intent to 
interfere with the economic relations of the Plaintiff in 
violation of Utah Code 58-1-501 (2) (a), 58-1-501(2) (b), and 
58-67-501(1) (c) (i) 
1 
Background: 
(1) The Defendants are both licensed physicians 
specializing in the practice of neurosurgery and they 
both maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant, Dr. Mark Reichman, 
is the Chief of the Neurosurgery Division at LDS 
Hospital. 
(2) The Plaintiff is a licensed physician specializing 
in orthopedic surgery and who also maintains active 
staff privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
(3) In the normal course of their respective 
businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are 
competitors for certain types of surgical patients 
seeking treatment for spinal disorders. 
(4) The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC 
Health Plans. This contract requires that the 
Plaintiff maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain 
Health Care facility. The Plaintiff has continued to 
2 
maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff is a Board 
certified orthopedic surgeon and is fellowship trained 
in spine surgery. 
) At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically 
utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures 
and neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss 
surgical microscope, va Leica surgical microscope, and 
an older model Zeiss surgical microscope. At LDS 
hospital, the operating rooms are numbered sequentially 
for identification. The newer Zeiss and the Leica 
microscope are typically stored and ready for use in 
operating room number Four and operating room number 
Five. These two microscopes are equipped so that a 
surgical assistant has a binocular head directly across 
from the operating surgeon allowing him to have 
essentially the same surgical perspective as the 
operating surgeon. This provides a measure of 
increased safety for the patient and also allows a more 
comfortable environment for the operative assistant. 
These two microscopes are also equipped with superior 
3 
optics and other features allowing a higher quality 
view and greater ease and flexibility for the surgeon 
and assistant during a surgical procedure. The older 
model Zeiss does not have these features and instead 
has an offset opposing headpiece that forces the 
assistant to be in an awkward position when she is 
assisting and does not allow for the same surgical 
perspective as the operating surgeon. It is generally 
a far inferior piece of equipment. 
(6) The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and 
utilized the operative microscopes for certain 
procedures when they were available in the normal 
course of his practice. These microscopes are owned by 
the hospital as capital equipment. On May 23rd, 2001 
the plaintiff had a surgical case scheduled in the LDS 
operating room. The Plaintiff's surgical case was 
scheduled in an operating room not typically utilized 
by the neurosurgical service. On that date there was a 
surgical microscope appropriate for the Plaintiff's 
needs physically located in another operating room 
where one of the defendants, Dr. Mark Reichman, was 
4 v^  
performing a neurosurgical procedure. Dr. Reichman was 
not using a microscope for the particular procedure he 
was performing. The Plaintiff asked Dr. Reichman if he 
was using the microscope in that operating room and if 
not, would he mind if the microscope was moved to 
another room so that the Plaintiff could use it. The 
microscopes are designed to be easily and safely moved 
from one place to another. Dr. Reichman asserted that 
the microscope was for neurosurgical procedures only. 
The Plaintiff pointed out that he wanted to use the 
microscope for a cervical spine fusion, a procedure 
commonly done as a neurosurgical procedure by 
neurosurgeons. Dr. Reichman then took the position 
that he had a proprietary interest in the microscope 
and that the microscope in the room he was operating in 
was for use by neurosurgeons only. He further asserted 
that use by non-neurosurgeons would lead to damage of 
the equipment and he suggested that the plaintiff buy 
his own microscope. 
) On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff sent a letter to 
Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of the operative 
5 
microscope for certain procedures was in the interests 
of delivering the highest possible patient care and 
that it was also important for patient safety. The 
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the 
use of operative microscopes and qualified to do so. 
The letter requested Dr. Reichman to change his 
position as to who he thought could appropriately u&e 
this equipment. 
(8) Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this 
request and instead asserted to the operating room 
staff that he had the authority to restrict the use of 
the surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the 
neurosurgery division and that the Plaintiff was 
forbidden to use them. 
(9) Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty, 
the Chief of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact 
owned and controlled the operating room equipment at 
LDS Hospital. On July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with 
Dr. Doty to discuss the issue. At this meeting Dr. 
Doty confirmed that the surgical microscopes in the LDS 
Hospital operating rooms were owned by LDS Hospital and 
6 
he indicated and that it would be acceptable and 
appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the surgical 
microscopes. 
(10) Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash, 
Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at 
LDS Hospital stating that "[t]he neurosurgery 
department is very busy and cannot provide adequate 
coverage for the neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if 
the microscopes are not available or being used by 
other services." He went on to state that the 
neurosurgeons would allow the Plaintiff the use of the 
older Zeiss microscope. He also went on to state that 
none of the neurosurgeons at LDS Hospital have any 
problem using this older Zeiss microscope when the 
newer Zeiss or Leica microscopes were not available. 
(11) On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting 
in the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a 
spinal surgery operation in operating room Five. 
Plaintiff was specifically waiting for Defendant Dr. 
Robert G. Peterson to finish his neurosurgical case in 
that room. After Dr. Peterson finished his case he 
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came into the lounge where the Plaintiff, a physicians 
assistant, and a otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon who 
Dr. Peterson was friendly with were sitting. Dr. 
Peterson had never met the Plaintiff before this and 
was therefore unaware of who he was. Dr. Peterson 
began talking to the ENT surgeon. He wanted to know if 
the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for his case. He 
encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the microscope from 
room Five for his ENT procedure so that the Plaintiff, 
who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure in 
Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not 
have it available for his case. He went on to state 
that he, himself, should "run that scope out" as "a 
banned surgeon" was following him in operating room 
Five. The Plaintiff overheard this and responded by 
going over to the Defendant and politely stating that 
he would like to introduce himself and that he was 
"Alan Brown, the banned surgeon." 
(12) On October 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff wrote to Dr. 
Doty agreeing to follow Dr. Reichman's August 1st, 2001 
suggestion that the Plaintiff use the older Zeiss but 
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contingent on some modifications being made. These 
modifications consisted of replacing the offset 
assistant's head with an opposing head and upgrading 
some of the other features and optics. These 
modifications could be done if the hospital was willing 
to expend the money for those modifications. The 
Plaintiff suggested that it was reasonable for him to 
continue to use the new Zeiss and the Leica microscopes 
until the appropriate modifications were made. 
Plaintiff also agreed that his use would only be when 
these microscopes were not being utilized by the 
neurosurgery service and therefore there would be no 
conflict or patient safety issue. Additionally, the 
Plaintiff documented in this letter to Dr. Doty the 
incident with Dr. Peterson on September 17th. The 
Plaintiff pointed out that it seemed that the 
neurosurgery service was more interested in interfering 
with the Plaintiff's practice than from keeping all 
other services from using the microscopes as had been 
previously suggested by the Defendants. There was no 
written or verbal response to this letter. 
9 
(13) From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the 
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope 
without apparent problems. Also during this time 
period Dr. Reichman continued to assert to the 
operating room staff that he had the authority to 
restrict access to the surgical microscopes in an 
attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using 
this equipment. 
(14) On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to 
Dr. Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and 
disassembled the newer Ziess and/or the Leica 
microscope(s). Defendants argued that as a result of 
the Plaintiff's causing a "generalized disrepair" of 
the microscopes, treatment of neurosurgery patients had 
been compromised and operating room time and stress had 
increased. Defendants continued to maintain that they 
had a right to restrict access to the microscopes 
Plaintiff wanted to use. A copy of this letter was 
sent to Dr. Doty and to the Dusty Clegg, R.N., 
Department Manager for the operating rooms. The 
Plaintiff was not sent a copy of this letter. 
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Plaintiff denies the truth of the allegations in this 
letter and is unaware of any documentation or proof of 
the allegations in this letter. 
(15) On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient 
scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The 
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests 
of quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled 
surgical assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica 
microscope was optimal. The modifications to the older 
Zeiss microscope had still not been done. When the 
Plaintiff came to the operating room he was told that 
Defendants were insistent that he could not use the 
newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes. This was despite 
the fact that at least one of these microscopes was 
available for use on that day as was one of the 
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was 
located. Plaintiff asked what his options were and 
called Dusty Clegg to request a suggestion on how to 
best handle the problem. Dusty Clegg recommended that 
Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was 
unproductive to call hospital administration. The 
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Plaintiff called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he 
wanted to use one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman 
had restricted. Dr. Reichman, without discussion, 
refused to change his assertion that the Plaintiff did 
not have Dr. Reichman's permission to use the 
microscopes. Plaintiff called Dr. William Hamilton, 
Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central Region, to 
explain the situation in brief. Dr. Hamilton, after 
some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff 
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the 
microscope in question. Plaintiff felt uncomfortable 
using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled 
the procedure. 
(16) The following day the Plaintiff called Dr. 
Hamilton requesting information and clarification on 
what happened the previous day. Dr. Hamilton 
apologized for the outcome and said that the hospital 
was dependent on the neurosurgical service to provide 
level one trauma care and also that the hospital was 
currently in negotiations with Dr. Reichman regarding 
the issue of neurosurgical coverage for trauma. He at 
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no time stated that Dr. Reichman had *cne ^ autrrroip^y^wa^ 
restrict access to the microscope nor did he state that 
any of the allegations made by the Defendants regarding 
damaged or disassembled equipment were true or even 
documented. 
CLAIMS 
(1) From May 23rd, 2001 through the present, 
Defendants have used unprofessional and unethical 
conduct with the intent to interfere with the 
economic relations of the Plaintiff in violation 
of Utah Code 58-1-501(2)(a), 58-1-501(2)(b), and 
58-67-501(1)(c)(i). 
(2) By misrepresenting his authority and intimidating 
the Plaintiff and the LDS Hospital operating room 
staff as well as hospital administrators, 
defendant Dr. Mark Reichman has practiced and 
attempted to practice his occupation using actions 
and communications which are false, misleading, 
deceptive and fraudulent in violation of Utah Code 
Section 58-1-501(2)(h). 
(3) Defendants have engaged in a pattern of activity 
including directly and indirectly intimidating 
others through actions and/or omissions with the 
intent to interfere with the Plaintiff's economic 
relations by wrongfully restricting access to 
essential hospital equipment for an improper 
purpose and through improper means causing injury 
to the Plaintiff. 
(4) The Defendant's malicious intent and unlawful 
methods will not support an affirmative defense of 
privilege. 
(5) Even if the Defendant's acts were not for the 
purpose of interfering with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations or even if the Defendants did 
not desire to interfere with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations, the Defendants knew that 
interference was substantially certain to occur as 
a result of their actions and as a necessary 
consequence thereof, the interference was 
intentional. 
(6) Witnesses and documents will establish clear and 
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convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the Defendants are the result of willful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or 
conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of the Plaintiff as required for punitive 
damages pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-18-
K D (a). 
Demands: 
(1) Plaintiff requests relief in the amount of 
$18,296.50 representing actual damages. 
(2) Plaintiff requests the Court award punitive 
damages and the costs of this suit and such 
further relief as the Courts sees fit. 
(3) Plaintiff requests permission to add parties and 
causes of action at a later date consistent with 
evidence adduced through discovery. 
(4) Plaintiff requests any additional damages accrued 
as a result of the Defendant's continued unlawful 
actions and omissions. 
(5) Plaintiff requests injunctive relief against 
future actions and/or omissions by the Defendants 
that would result in unlawful interference with 
the Plaintiff's economic relations. 
Dated July 29th, 2002. 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Attorney, acting for himself: 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the enclosed Amended Complaint and Request for Jury Trial this 
July 29, 2002 to: 
Robert Peterson, M.D. 
370 9th Ave Suite 111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Lan B. Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the enclosed Amended Complaint and Request for Jury Trial this 
July 29, 2002 to: 
Mark Reichman, M.D. 
370 9th Ave Suite 111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
ran B. Brown 
ADDENDUM 2 
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for More 
Definite Statement. R. 49 - 50 
<l'JUR-i;iFI<mH'Jb?01NSEKVICK 
I hereby certify that on August 23,2002,1 served the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, by mailing 
a true and correct copy thereof, by first-class United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as 
follows: 
Alan B. Brown, M.D. 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Bruce H. Jensen 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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185 South State Street, Suite 700 
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Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
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Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT 
PETERSON, M.D. 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT PETERSON'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT 
Civil No. 020906986 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson") moves under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE to dismiss the complaint of Alan Brown, M.D. ("Dr. Brown") on the 
grounds that the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim against Dr. Peterson. Alternatively, 
Dr. Peterson moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
This motion is accompanied by a supporting memorandum filed concurrently with this 
motion. 
DATED: August 23,2002. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGH« PETERS 
Harold L. Reiser 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
ADDENDUM 3 
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement. R. 51 - 56 
AS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
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Attorneys for Defendant - Robert Peterson, M.D. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT 
PETERSON, M.D. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
DEFENDANT PETERSON'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT 
Civil No. 020906986 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Defendant, Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson"), has moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to dismiss the Complaint of Alan Brown, M.D. ("Dr. Brown") 
pro se, on the grounds that the allegations do not state a claim against him. Alternatively, Dr. 
Peterson moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
This action arises from plaintiffs desire to use a particular microscope in a surgical 
procedure. Dr. Brown seeks actual damages of $ 18,296.50 for unspecified economic injury, punitive 
damages and injunctive relief. 
In the Complaint, the sole allegation against Dr. Peterson is that he once referred to Dr. 
Brown as a "banned surgeon", a reference to Dr. Brown's use of a particular microscope used by 
surgery, Dr. Peterson Has "intended77 to interfere with Plaintiffs prospective economic relations and 
somehow damaged Dr. Brown.1 Dr. Brown cryptically alleges that the Defendants, both 
neurological surgeons, "have engaged in a pattern of activity including directly and indirectly 
intimidating others through actions and/or omissions with the intent to interfere with Plaintiffs 
economic relations by wrongfully restricting access to essential hospital equipment for an improper 
purpose and through improper means causing injury to the Plaintiff/' Complaint at 13. Further, 
defects in the pleadings are revealed by Dr. Brown inconsistently claiming that "even if the 
Defendant's [sic] acts were not for the purpose of interfering with the Plaintiffs economic relations 
. . , the interference was intentional. Complaint at 14. 
Distilled to its essence and given the very most liberal construction to his pleadings, Dr. 
Brown complains that, because he is not able to use a particular microscope in surgery, he has been 
damaged. Dr. Brown concedes that other microscopes, although allegedly "inferior" were available 
for his use. Complaint at 2, 3. Nonetheless, because he could not use a particular microscope, the 
defendants have intended to interfere with his economic relations. 
Utah law does not recognize the tort of "intent* to interfere with prospective economic 
relations but, rather, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Dr. 
Brown concedes that even though Dr. Brown may not have actually interfered with Dr. Brown's 
prospective economic relations, the interference was intentional Complaint at 14, ^  5. Having 
conceded that there was no actual interference with Dr. Brown's actual economic relations, under 
The microscopes in question are owned by the hospital as capital equipment. Complaint at 4. 
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the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 
(Utah 1982), the Complaint is defective and must therefore be dismissed. 
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is 
liable for tortious interference with business relationships if the plaintiff proves M(l) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) 
for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." A party is subject 
to liability for an intentional interference with present contractual relations if he intentionally and 
improperly causes one of the parties not to perform the contract. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
766 (1979). St Benedict's Development Company v. St Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 201 
(Utah 1991). Conspicuous by its absence is any factual allegation that Dr. Brown intentionally or 
otherwise unlawfully caused Dr. Brown to not perform any contract or otherwise interfered with any 
economic relationship as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet and St Benedict's Development 
Company Co. Distilled to its essence, Dr. Peterson commented that Dr. Brown was a "banned 
surgeon" and could not use a particular microscope. Dr, Brown admits that after this single 
comment on September 17,2002, that "from October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002, the Plaintifif 
utilized the Leica and newer Ziess microscope without apparent problems." Complaint at 9. 
Thereafter, the pleadings are absent as to any other reasonable inference that Dr. Peterson committed 
any unlawful act or other breach of duty allegedly owed to Dr. Brown. There is simply no allegation 
in the Complaint that defendant interfered with any contract or economic relationship. Plaintiff, a 
medical doctor, does not specify how his economic relations were affected or whether patients were 
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ill-served by anything that defendant did or didn't do.2 As trite as it may seem, Dr. Brown does not 
have, and has not alleged, that he has a contractual right to use any particular microscope. Dr. 
Brown recites that he petitioned hospital administration about the dispute but that there has been "no 
written or verbal responsejs]" to his letter. Complaint 9. Presumably, his damages are the cost of 
a new microscope. If not, then the pleadings give insufficient particularity for Dr. Brown to frame 
a responsive pleading other than a motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiffs complaint is also defective because he has no standing to bring claims under Utah 
Code Ann Section 58-l-501(2)(a), (2)(b)b and 58-67-501(c)(i). Proceedings for alleged 
unprofessional or unethical conduct is exclusively the duty of Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing under Chapter 58 of the Utah Code. Plaintiff has no standing to allege 
violations of Utah law in this civil action. 
CONCLUSION 
With undisputed Utah law and precedent dictating what actions may be lawfully addressed 
in this state's courts, Dr. Brown's allegations against Dr. Peterson are defective as a matter of law. 
Dr. Peterson should not have to defend against such defective and trivial accusations. Plaintiff has 
failed to satisfy the requirements of Utah law and accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint falls short of 
stating a claim for tortious interference with economic relations and may be properly dismissed. 
Without more, no claim for interference with economic relations can lie and Dr. Peterson's Motion 
to Dismiss may be granted. 
2
 Plaintiff alleges that on July 2,2002, ten (10) months after the "banned surgeon" comment, he "felt 
uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled the procedure." Complaint 
at 12. Plaintiff does not allege whether this alleged cancellation caused any damages, whether the 
procedure was later rescheduled nor does he allege how Dr. Peterson (or any other person) 
improperly interfered with the surgical procedure. 
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FOR ~ xnv/Kn: DEFINITE STATEMENT 
Alternatively, Dr. Brown should be required to make a more definite statement under Rule 
12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE how (and if) any Defendant actually and 
intentionally interfered with the Plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations; (2) clarifying 
the improper purpose or by improper means employed by any Defendant; and (3) how the Plaintiff 
was injured as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. The Plaintiff should also 
clarify his claims for relief which indiscriminately refer to "Defendant's" action without any 
reference to a particular Defendant See, e.g., Complaint at 13. ("The Defendant's [sic] malicious 
intent and unlawful methods will not support an affirmative defense of privilege.") 
Plaintiffs complaint fails to give sufficient detail or notice to Dr. Peterson so he can frame 
responsive pleading or craft discovery to defend against the allegations in the complaint. If the 
>mplaint if not dismissed for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff should give a more definite statement 
to the claims he makes against Dr. Peterson. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 2002. 
PARSONS, DAV^S, KINGHORN^ PETERS 
Bv: /{y^^ ^ _ L _ 
Ha&ld L. Reiser 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. 
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CERTBFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 23, 2002, I served the foregoing, MEMORANDUM 
ORTING MOTION TO DISMISS ORINTHE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FORMORE 
NITE STATEMENT, by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, by first-class United States 
>ostage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Alan B. Brown, M.D. 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Bruce H. Jensen 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Plaintiff7Appellant's Memorandum . . . Against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 
Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement. R 61 - 83 
Alan B. Brown (#7693) 
Attorney, acting for himself 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801) 541-5492 
(801) 964-3436 fax 
By. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 9 2002 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert 
Peterson, M.D. 
Defendants 
Memorandum Supporting Default 
Entry and Against Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's 
Motion for a More Definite Statement 
Case No. 020906986 
The Honorable Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod 
Plaintiff had a constable properly serve the Defendant with 
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons on July 23rd, 2002. On 
August 15th, 2002 Defendant Robert Peterson had still failed 
to answer and so Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment 
pursuant to URCP 55(a)(1). On August 23rd, 2002 Defendant 
moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Claim pursuant to URCP 12(b)(6) 
on the grounds that the Plaintiff's allegations do not state 
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a Claim. In the alternative, Defendant made a Motion for a 
More Definite Statement. 
I. Defendant' s Motion is Barred as Defendant Has Failed 
to Plead as Required by URCP 12 (a) 
A. FACTS 
Defendants Dr. Mark Reichman and Dr. Robert Peterson 
were personally served by a constable on July 23rd, 2001 with 
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons as required under URCP 4. 
Proof of Service, a copy of the Claim and Ten Day Summons has 
been filed with the Court as required under URCP 3(a). An 
Amended Complaint was filed with the Court and served upon 
the Defendants on August 29th, 2002. Robert Peterson, M.D. 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as required by URCP 12(a) 
until after August 16th, 2002. Pursuant-to URCP 55(a) (1), 
Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment against defendant Dr. 
Robert Peterson on August 15th. 
B. ISSUE 
URCP 60(b) provides in part that on motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
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justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. Defendant Robert Peterson 
discussed the Complaint with his partner and co-defendant 
Mark Reichman. Dr. Reichman emphasized to Dr. Peterson that 
they needed separate counsel and that the Complaint needed 
to be answered. Dr. Peterson is a Board certified 
Neurosurgeon with extensive education and training. 
Defendant Peterson's failure to plead in a timely manner 
indicates indifference to the legal process and therefore 
does not entitle him to relief under URCP 60(b). 
II. Plaintiff's Response to Request for a More Definite 
Statement and Defense that His Complaint States a 
Claim for which Relief Could be Granted. 
A. FACTS: 
The Defendants are both licensed physicians 
specializing in the practice of neurosurgery. Both 
Defendants maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendants are also partners 
acting under the business name Neurosurgical Associates, 
L.L.C. Defendant Dr. Mark Reichman, is the Chief of the 
Neurosurgery Division at LDS Hospital. The Plaintiff is a 
licensed physician specializing in orthopedic surgery and 
who also maintains active staff privileges at LDS Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the normal course of their 
respective businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are 
competitors for certain types of surgical patients seeking 
treatment for spinal disorders. 
The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC 
A 
Health Plans. This contract requires that the Plaintiff 
maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain Health Care 
facility and also requires that certain patients with IHC 
Health Plan medical insurance be treated at an IHC 
contracted hospital such as LDS Hospital. The contract 
between IHC Health Plans and the Plaintiff also provides 
generally that the Plaintiff will provide surgical services 
for IHC Health Plans' beneficiaries in exchange for IHC 
Health Plans paying for those services. The Plaintiff has 
continued to maintain active staff privileges at LDS 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically 
utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures and 
neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss surgical 
microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and an older model 
Zeiss surgical microscope. The Defendant's have never 
disputed that the Leica and newer Zeiss microscopes are 
superior in quality to the older Zeiss. These superior 
quality makes certain surgical procedures safer for the 
patients and more comfortable for the surgeon and the 
surgical assistant. 
5 
The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and 
utilized the operative microscopes for certain procedures 
when they were available in the normal course of his 
practice. These microscopes are owned by the hospital as 
capital equipment- On May 23rd, 2001 the plaintiff had a 
surgical case scheduled in the LDS operating room. Dr. 
Reichman indicated that the Plaintiff was not allowed to use 
either of the two newer microscopes as they were for the 
exclusive use of the Defendants and the other members of the 
Neurosurgery Division as well as neurosurgery resident 
physicians in training. On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff 
sent a letter to Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of 
the operative microscope for certain procedures was in the 
interests of delivering the highest possible patient care 
and that it was also important for patient safety. The 
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the use 
of operative microscopes and qualified to do so. The letter 
requested Dr. Reichman to change his position as to who he 
thought could appropriately use this equipment. 
Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this 
request and instead asserted to the operating room staff 
that he had the authority to restrict the use of the 
surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the neurosurgery 
division and that the Plaintiff was forbidden to use them. 
Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty, the Chief 
of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact owned and 
controlled the operating room equipment at LDS Hospital. On 
July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with Dr. Doty to discuss 
the issue. At this meeting Dr. Doty confirmed that the 
surgical microscopes in the LDS Hospital operating rooms 
were owned by LDS Hospital and he indicated and that it 
would be acceptable and appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the 
surgical microscopes. 
Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash, 
Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at LDS 
Hospital stating that "[t]he neurosurgery department is very 
busy and cannot provide adequate coverage for the 
neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are 
not available or being used by other services." This 
letter also states that "[t]he neurosurgeons have met in 
this regard and the opinions are unanimous." Defendant 
Robert Peterson's name is on the letterhead indicating that 
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he was acting in concert with Dr. Reichman on this issue. 
On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting in 
the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a spinal 
surgery operation in operating room Five. Plaintiff was 
specifically waiting for Defendant Dr. Robert G. Peterson to 
finish his neurosurgical case in that room. After Dr. 
Peterson finished his case he came into the lounge where the 
Plaintiff, a physicians assistant, and a 
otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon with whom Dr. Peterson 
was friendly with were sitting. Dr. Peterson had never met 
the Plaintiff before this and was therefore unaware of who 
he was. Dr. Peterson began talking to the ENT surgeon. He 
wanted to know if the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for 
his case. He encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the 
microscope from room Five for his ENT procedure so that the 
Plaintiff, who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure 
in Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not have 
it available for his case. He went on to state that he, 
himself, should "run that scope out" as "a banned surgeon" 
was following him in operating room Five. The Plaintiff 
overheard this and responded by going over to the Defendant 
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and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself 
and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon." 
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the 
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope 
without apparent problems. Also during this time period 
both of the Defendant's continued to assert to the operating 
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority 
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes. This was a 
direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using 
this equipment. 
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr. 
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and 
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s). 
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's 
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes, 
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and 
operating room time and stress had increased. Defendants 
continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict 
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use. The 
signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this 
letter. 
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From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the 
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope 
without apparent problems. Also during this time period 
both of the Defendants continued to assert to the operating 
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority 
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes. This was a 
direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using 
this equipment. 
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr. 
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and 
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s). 
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's 
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes, 
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and 
operating room time and stress had increased. Defendants 
continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict 
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use. The 
signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this 
letter. 
On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient 
scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The 
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests of 
quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled surgical 
assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was 
necessary. When the Plaintiff came to the operating room he 
was told that Defendants were insistent that he could not 
use the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes. This was 
despite the fact that at least one of these microscopes was 
available for use on that day as was one of the 
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was 
located. Plaintiff asked Dusty Clegg, the operating room 
manager, what his options were and to request a suggestion 
on how to best handle the problem. Dusty Clegg recommended 
that Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was 
unproductive to call hospital administration. The Plaintiff 
called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he wanted to use 
one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman had restricted. 
Dr. Reichman, without discussion, refused to change his 
assertion that the Plaintiff did not have Dr. Reichman's 
permission to use the microscopes. Plaintiff called Dr. 
10 
William Hamilton, Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central 
Region, to explain the situation in brief. Dr. Hamilton, 
after some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff 
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the microscope in 
question. Plaintiff felt that given the nature of the 
surgical procedure, in the interests of patient safety the 
case should be cancelled. 
The following day the Plaintiff called Dr. Hamilton 
requesting information and clarification on what happened 
the previous day. Dr. Hamilton apologized for the outcome 
and said that the hospital was dependent on the 
neurosurgical service to provide level one trauma care and 
also that the hospital was currently in negotiations with 
Dr. Reichman regarding the issue of neurosurgical coverage 
for trauma. He at no time stated that the neurosurgical 
division had the authority to restrict access to the 
microscope nor did he state that any of the allegations made 
by the Defendants regarding damaged or disassembled 
equipment were true or even documented. 
B. ISSUES 
1. Defendant Robert Peterson admits that Utah 
11 - \ : L 
law recognizes the tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations and cites Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).1 
Defendant Peterson asserts that Plaintiff's Complaint is 
defective because Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant 
Peterson intentionally interfered with any of the 
Plaintiff's contracts as required under Leigh Furniture.2 
The Court in Leigh Furniture ("and similarly in Mum ford v. 
ITT Commercial Finance Corp.3) recognized a common-law cause 
of action for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, and adopted the Oregon definition of 
this tort-4 Under this definition, in order to recover 
damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant 
intentionally interfered with the plaintifffs existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or 
by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.5 The 
Court also noted that privilege is an affirmative defense.6 
1
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement at 2. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 
1993)• 
4
 Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982) 
5
 Id,, at 304. 
6
 Id. 
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The tort of interference with economic relations 
is an intentional tort.7 Plaintiff will present evidence 
that will show that Defendant's intentionally interfered 
with the Plaintiff's existing and potential economic 
relations with his patients and their insurance company. 
This evidence will include documents and testimony that will 
prove that the Defendants wrongfully and unlawfully used 
their positions as the providers of neurosurgical services 
to LDS Hospital to intimidate the hospital staff and 
administration with the specific intent to restrict the 
Plaintiff's use of certain equipment. Plaintiff will 
thereby satisfy the intent requirement under Mumford v. ITT 
Commercial Finance Corp 8 and Leigh Furniture.9 
Plaintiff also intends to prove that the Defendants 
made fraudulent and misleading statements in order to 
further their goal of interfering with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations. The improper means element in Mumford 
is satisfied when "the means used to interfere with a 
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as 
7
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah) 
App. 1993). 
8
 Id. 
9
 Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 305 (Utah 1982). 
violations of statutes, regulation, or recognized common-law 
rules*10 Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves 
and hence are clearly * improper' means of interference../'11 
"Commonly included among improper means are violence, 
threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, 
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging 
falsehood."12 Means may also be improper or wrongful because 
they violate "an established standard of a trade or 
profession."13 In the instant case, Defendant's have 
interfered with Plaintiff's practice in violation of Utah 
Code 58-1-501(2)(a), 58-1-501(2)(b), and 58-67-501(1)(c)(i). 
They have also used intimidation and violated standards of 
the profession of medicine. The Plaintiff will prove that 
the improper means element is satisfied. 
Plaintiff asserts that under certain circumstances 
the equipment in question is vital to his economic relations 
in that it allows him to provide increased safety and a 
higher quality of care to his patients. As a direct result 
10
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins, Co., 582 P. 2d 1365, 1371 
and FN 11 (Oregon 1978). 
13
 Id., at 1371. 
of the Defendant's interference with the Plaintiff's 
economic relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a 
surgical case thereby causing economic injury to the 
Plaintiff. 
2. Defendant Peterson, in his Motion to Dismiss, 
claims that Plaintiff conceded that there was no actual 
interference with the Plaintiff's economic relations,14 In 
fact, Plaintiff concedes nothing of the sort- Plaintiff 
merely points out that even if a Defendant does not act for 
the purpose of interfering or does not desire it but knows 
that the interference is substantially certain to occur as a 
result of a defendant's action and is a necessary 
consequence thereof, the interference is intentional-15 
URCP 8(e)(2) provides in part that "[a] party may set forth 
two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in 
separate counts or defenses- When two or more statements are 
made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 
14
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
• the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 2. 
15
 Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of 
consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both.16 The Plaintiff's Complaint is not 
defective on the grounds that he conceded that there was no 
actual interference. Plaintiff's Complaint does not support 
this defense. 
3, Defendant Peterson claims that Plaintiff's 
pleadings are absent any reasonable inference that Defendant 
Peterson committed any unlawful act or other breach of duty 
allegedly owed to Dr. Brown.17 The Defendants are partners 
sharing various duties and responsibilities in a contractual 
relationship- Additionally, Defendant Reichman has 
indicated that his actions and allegations are supported by 
all of his partners and his assertions are representative of 
all the members of Neurosurgical Associates, L.L.C. 
Defendant Peterson is a member of Neurosurgical Associates, 
L.L.C. and his signature appears on a letter that 
17
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 3. 
16 
fraudulently implies that Plaintiff caused damage to 
equipment and delay in patient treatment. Therefore, any 
actions that the Claim charges against Defendant Reichman is 
also imputed to Defendant Peterson. Additionally, 
Defendant's actions, including his statements to other 
physicians that Plaintiff was a banned surgeon and that the 
Defendant should physically remove a vital piece of 
equipment from an operating room in order to keep the 
Plaintiff from rightfully using that piece of equipment is 
consistent with the Plaintiff's allegations of 
unprofessional and unlawful behavior. Plaintiff has stated 
claims very particularly and very specifically against both 
of the Defendants. 
4, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Complaint 
does not specify how his economic relations were affected or 
whether patients were ill served by anything that the 
Defendant did or did not do.18 Plaintiff was unwilling to 
subject a patient to unnecessary and increased risk by using 
an inferior piece of equipment when safer and higher quality 
equipment was available. Although the equipment was 
id. at 4. 
physically available, the Defendant's wrongful and unlawful 
actions directly and indirectly restricted the Plaintiff's 
access to this equipment. Therefore, in the interests of 
patient safety and quality of patient care, Plaintiff 
canceled a surgical procedure when the Defendant's 
interfered with his attempt at fulfilling his obligations 
under his contract with IHC Health Plans, Plaintiff's 
Complaint very specifically points out that as a direct 
result of the Defendant's interference with his economic 
relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a surgical 
case,19 The Defendant knew, or should have known that this 
result was a likely and necessary consequence of his 
actions. Defendant Peterson is in the business of providing 
surgical services to patients. Defendant Peterson is well 
aware of the economic consequences of canceling a scheduled 
surgical case. The claim by Defendant Peterson that there 
is no factual allegation that Dr. Peterson intentionally or 
otherwise unlawfully caused Plaintiff to not perform any 
contract or otherwise interfered with Plaintiff's economic 
relations is without merit. 
19
 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 12. 
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5. Defendant Peterson has alleged that 
Plaintiff's Complaint is defective in that it gives 
insufficient particularity regarding damages.20 Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint specifies actual damages as $18,296.50.21 
This amount represents the approximate surgical fee for the 
cancelled case. 
6. Defendant Peterson alleges that Plaintiff's 
Complaint is defective because he has no standing to bring 
claims under Utah Code Ann Section 58-1-501 (2) (a), (2)(b), 
and 58-67-501(a)(c)(i). Plaintiff is not claiming that he 
has standing to bring action based on violations of these 
Code Sections. Plaintiff is merely pointing out that the 
Defendants have violated these Code Sections thereby 
supporting his claim that the Defendants have improperly (as 
defined in Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. 858 P.2d. 
1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993)) interfered with his economic 
relations. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
1. URCP 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to 
20
 Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 4. 
21
 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 15. 
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dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is treated as one for summary judgment. 
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment 
requires that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.22 In a case of motion for 
summary judgment by the Defendant, the Plaintiff is 
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to him,23 Plaintiff has fairly and 
with specificity stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. There are many issues of material fact which 
would affect the outcome of this matter and so Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that Defendant's motion to dismiss 
is denied. 
2. Plaintiff has set forth his claims with 
specificity and particularity. Plaintiff's allegations 
are neither vague nor ambiguous. Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion for a 
More Definite Statement. 
URCP 56(c). 
20 
Dated August 26th, 2002. 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
Attorney, acting for himself: 
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. 
2240 Parleys Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
23 Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953) 
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